On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 10:42 AM, Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> On Friday, September 29, 2017 at 2:52:49 PM UTC-7, Eric Mill wrote: > > That dynamic is natural, but accepting that this dynamic exists is > > different than giving into it in some absolute way. When offering second > > chances, requiring that the person/org fulfill certain conditions that > > speak directly to their ability to have learned and adapted from the > thing > > they failed at the first time is an approach that accepts this dynamic, > > without shutting the door on people or organizations that have grown as a > > result of the experience. > > > > I think it would arguably lead to worse behavior, and less disclosure of > > incidents and mistakes, if Mozilla adopted a posture where second chances > > are rarely given. Not saying that's what's being said here, but I think > > it's worth emphasizing that the first principle here should be to > optimize > > for incentivizing the behavior you want out of the CA community that > > protects users and increases information sharing. > > > > -- Eric > > > I agree with Eric on this. > > The last sentence in our CA Communications and Mozilla Security Blog Posts > regarding our CA Program is frequently: > "... we believe that the best approach to safeguard that security is to > work with CAs as partners, to foster open and frank communication, and to > be diligent in looking for ways to improve." > > Below are my personal feelings... > > In the case of WoSign and StartCom, I felt such a level of deception that > it will be extremely difficult for either CA to ever gain my trust again. > Rightly or wrongly so, I have not recognized that level of deception from > other CAs in Mozilla's program. The deception happened before Inigo went to > StartCom, and I appreciate all of Inigo's efforts, but due to the position > he is now in, he will have to do an outstanding job, be test-driven, and > demonstrate a truly clean CA hierarchy in order to regain my trust in > StartCom. Unfortunately, I just don't feel that I've seen that so far. > > In regards to PROCERT, I do not believe that they have intentionally > deceived me, but that their representatives responded to previous CA > Communications and the Bugzilla Bug without getting their technical people > involved. That is very bad! and I am very disappointed! But perhaps there > are actions that they can take to demonstrate their commitment to not > repeating those mistakes, to putting code into place to prevent > non-BR-compliant cert issuance, and to show that they do have the level of > technical knowledge in their organization that is needed to operate a good > CA. > These are also my personal feelings, and not speaking on behalf of Mozilla or Google. I think these are excellent ways of framing the discussion, given the current state of the ecosystem and the incentives. I think attempting to blackball a CA organization is largely ineffective, for reasons others have highlighted - such as the lack of transparency around beneficial or controlling interests. With respect to PROCERT, I think it's important to note that there are several problematic practices: - The displayed technical competence was grossly insufficient for the level of trust afforded. - The technical responses (continue) to demonstrate a degree of interpretative leeway that is not supported by the text. - The sum totality of the number and nature of the incidents raise serious concerns about the overall operation. Unlike other incidents, there's no one "Fix this thing" incident - it's a systemic failure of both implementation and oversight that caused the loss of a trust, a dozen of incidents both big and small, and the response to those incidents, that caused a loss of trust. I think it's reasonable to suggest that developing technical competence is not something that will happen overnight. And systemically addressing the organizational and operational failures will require a careful degree of analysis of the past issues and preventive steps (of which revocation is, again, completely insufficient). We've also seen from past incidents and discussions that one year is very likely too short a time to allow such remediations. If anything, it incentivizes hasty changes, rather than methodical analysis. It's very likely that, for an organization like PROCERT, it would be far more appropriate to suggest something like three or more years - to allow them the opportunity to invest and improve. Similarly, given the nature of these incidents, it seems reasonable to suggest that new keys must be used, without any relation to the old keys or infrastructure. This hopefully goes without saying. In terms of oversight and audits, it seems beneficial to have a community-agreed upon auditor, a Mozilla-delegated auditor, or even an open RFP, so that auditors themselves can compete on the thoroughness and oversight that they can provide. Similarly, it seems reasonable to expect a more detailed audit report, in which management attests to their system design, and the controls they have in place to ensure compliance, as well as the auditor's evaluation of those controls (including all controls the auditor evaluated, not just those that were successfully validated). This assertion by management - and the auditors independent assessment of the factual veracity of that assertion - can help provide a greater level of assurance that PROCERT has successfully understood and integrated the BRs. These are just some ideas on concrete steps to restore trust when there is a systemic pattern of failures and misunderstandings. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

