On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:03:22PM -0600, Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 8:54 PM bif via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > But BRs are not to be interpreted, just to be applied to the letter, > > whether it makes sense or not. When it no longer makes sense, the wording > > can be improved for the future. > > Indeed. But following BR 7.1 to the letter apparently doesn't get you all > the way to compliance, by some opinions.
No, *misinterpreting* BR 7.1 doesn't get you all the way to compliance. > After all, nothing in 7.1 > requires anything as to the quality of the underlying CSPRNG utilized. The "CS" is "CSPRNG" stands for "cryptographically secure", and "CSPRNG" is defined in the BRs. > It > does not specify whether the 64-bits must be comprised of sequential bits > of data output by the CSPRNG, Nor does it need to. > nor does it specify that one is not permitted > to discard inconvenient values (assuming you seek replacement values from > the CSPRNG). If you generate a 64-bit random value, then discard some values based on any sort of quality test, the end result is a 64-bit value with less-than-64-bits of randomness. The reduction in randomness depends on the exact quality function employed. - Matt _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
