Am Freitag, 14. Dezember 2012, 19:32:18 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> - HTTPS ensures that the executable hasn't been tampered with. However, the
> friend providing it may be malicious, computer illiterate, or running a
> corrupted build they got from another friend. Trusting your friend is not
> necessarily enough here IMHO. - Therefore we want to verify the signature
> from FPI as well.

I don’t think that this is strictly necessary. If your friend runs a corrupted
build, you have a problem anyway. Another layer of security might be nice,
anyway, though: Don’t make it too easy for people to infiltrate freenet…

I like the zip-idea, though, because it would allow shipping more than one
installer: One for Windows, one for GNU/Linux and one for MacOSX.

And we can provide the sha1 hash of the files along with IP:Port:password, so
GNU/Linux users can easily check for manipulations.

> One fundamental problem with QR codes is they're primarily read by phones
> and tablets, which can't realistically run Freenet.

It might be possible to prompt the user to send the URL via email to their
home-computer.

In that case, the QR-code would simply save the typing of the text from a
custom business-card.

Also people running freenet might not want to use their email address to send
the data: don’t leave a data trail between the two people (which is too easy
to follow).

One more option: Only provide your FOAF connections, NOT your own IP.

Best wishes,
Arne
--
1w6 sie zu achten,
sie alle zu finden,
in Spiele zu leiten
und sacht zu verbinden.
→ http://1w6.org

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