Am Donnerstag, 20. Dezember 2012, 17:31:30 schrieb Matthew Toseland: > > The question is which trail. E-Mails are open to global surveillance. > > Connections not necessarily (they are much more work to track all the > > time).
> If you are targeted as an individual, they can tell who your friends are,
> that you run Freenet, who your darknet peers are etc.
That’s true, but not relevant to email. The problem with email is that they
can catch freenet invites via email without knowing you - at least if you are
not using GnuPG, which sadly is the case for most people.
The just need to filter all email by keywords - and I’m pretty sure that this
is already the case.
So sending an invite via email could make you a target.
> However, in the common case "what happens if they bust me", especially if
> it's only for running Freenet, we need the list of darknet peers to be
> similar to the set of people you communicate with anyway. NOT your secret
> revolutionary friends (you should use Freemail to talk to them!). This is
> an additional requirement, above our general threat model (which is
> concerned with *hiding*) but IMHO it reflects real-world concerns.
That’s true, yes. But I would make it less strict:
“not your revolutionary friends with whom you do not communicate otherwise”.
That still allows anarchist groups to interconnect (they just need to hide
their decision making structures, but not that they are in the group).
> > You give him a freenet-card and he can get freenet and connect to some
> > people. There will only be a second-level connection between them and
> > you, though.
> >
> > And in case we get connections over tor running, the connection might not
> > actually be traceable easily.
>
> Still not sure I follow. Who are they a darknet peer of?
I’ll try to make it visible.
Assume we have Secret Activist J..
He runs his darknet connections to Less Secret Activist Alice over tor.
Also he is connected to many other Less Secret Activists over tor and i2p.
E
|
i2p
C ⇔tor⇔ J ⇔tor⇔ Alice
i2p
|
D
He meets Newbie Bob in the street.
Now he gives Bob a Freenet Card. That card contains a URL with IP, Port and
Password which Bob can use to connect to Alice.
When Bob gets home, he types the URL into his browser. His browser openly
connects to Alice and downloads the freenet bundle. That bundle allows him to
connect to the FOAFs of J, but not to J himself.
E
|
C ⇔ Bob ⇔ Alice
|
D
Essentially J can bring people into the group of Alice, D E and F without
exposing himself to them.
The only thing needed for that is a bundle which *only* includes the noderefs
of FOAFs, but not the noderef of the offering node.
> > * Don’t crack your freenet
> > * Don’t let someone else tamper with your computer without warning me
> > first.
> It's not even a matter of "I'm sure this person won't try to surveil me".
> Remember the alternative is opennet. It's "it's less likely that they will
> try to surveil me than that [the bad guys my flog is gonna piss off] will
> try to surveil me" (and succeed, on opennet!). Or something close to that.
I think that this is pretty close to “don’t crack your freenet”. Because the
bad guys don’t know me, yet, but my friends do. So if we assume that not every
opennet user is automatically subject to surveillance, the chance that my
friends try to surveil me is actually higher - if my friends are people who
would crack freenet to spy on me.
So I have to trust my friends enough to think that they won’t spend
considerable effort to spy on me.
Maybe I should not connect to the lesser day saint who tells me on and off
that I am with Satan and that he will prove that I watch porn.
But my easygoing drinking buddy „live and let live“ would be a fitting
candidate for a freenet friend.
Best wishes,
Arne
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