On Thursday 20 Dec 2012 22:36:55 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote: > Am Donnerstag, 20. Dezember 2012, 17:31:30 schrieb Matthew Toseland: > > > The question is which trail. E-Mails are open to global surveillance. > > > Connections not necessarily (they are much more work to track all the > > > time). > > > If you are targeted as an individual, they can tell who your friends are, > > that you run Freenet, who your darknet peers are etc. > > That’s true, but not relevant to email. The problem with email is that they > can catch freenet invites via email without knowing you - at least if you are > not using GnuPG, which sadly is the case for most people. > > The just need to filter all email by keywords - and I’m pretty sure that this > is already the case. > > So sending an invite via email could make you a target.
Fair point. > > > However, in the common case "what happens if they bust me", especially if > > it's only for running Freenet, we need the list of darknet peers to be > > similar to the set of people you communicate with anyway. NOT your secret > > revolutionary friends (you should use Freemail to talk to them!). This is > > an additional requirement, above our general threat model (which is > > concerned with *hiding*) but IMHO it reflects real-world concerns. > > That’s true, yes. But I would make it less strict: > > “not your revolutionary friends with whom you do not communicate otherwise”. > > That still allows anarchist groups to interconnect (they just need to hide > their decision making structures, but not that they are in the group). Well, if the authorities seize your node, they will have your friends from your darknet peers. If they even surveil your connection, they'll have your darknet peers. Your darknet peers should not therefore give away any relationships they can't find out about easily enough anyway. > > > > You give him a freenet-card and he can get freenet and connect to some > > > people. There will only be a second-level connection between them and > > > you, though. > > > > > > And in case we get connections over tor running, the connection might not > > > actually be traceable easily. > > > > Still not sure I follow. Who are they a darknet peer of? > > I’ll try to make it visible. > > Assume we have Secret Activist J.. > He runs his darknet connections to Less Secret Activist Alice over tor. > Also he is connected to many other Less Secret Activists over tor and i2p. > > E > | > i2p > C ⇔tor⇔ J ⇔tor⇔ Alice > i2p > | > D Hmmm... problems: 1. Tor may be blocked. 2. Even if it's not, using it may make the activist in question more visible. Aren't these show-stoppers for using Freenet over Tor actually being useful? > > He meets Newbie Bob in the street. > > Now he gives Bob a Freenet Card. That card contains a URL with IP, Port and > Password which Bob can use to connect to Alice. > > When Bob gets home, he types the URL into his browser. His browser openly > connects to Alice and downloads the freenet bundle. That bundle allows him to > connect to the FOAFs of J, but not to J himself. > > E > | > C ⇔ Bob ⇔ Alice > | > D > > Essentially J can bring people into the group of Alice, D E and F without > exposing himself to them. > > The only thing needed for that is a bundle which *only* includes the noderefs > of FOAFs, but not the noderef of the offering node. What is his connection status? Is he a friend or an FOAF? Still not sure I follow this... > > > > * Don’t crack your freenet > > > * Don’t let someone else tamper with your computer without warning me > > > first. > > It's not even a matter of "I'm sure this person won't try to surveil me". > > Remember the alternative is opennet. It's "it's less likely that they will > > try to surveil me than that [the bad guys my flog is gonna piss off] will > > try to surveil me" (and succeed, on opennet!). Or something close to that. > > I think that this is pretty close to “don’t crack your freenet”. Because the > bad guys don’t know me, yet, but my friends do. So if we assume that not > every > opennet user is automatically subject to surveillance, the chance that my > friends try to surveil me is actually higher - if my friends are people who > would crack freenet to spy on me. Right, but if we assume that, we're criminally stupid. It's a fair bet that if it's straightforward to trace people on opennet, somebody will try. Fortunately this hasn't happened yet but that's not for technical reasons. :| > > So I have to trust my friends enough to think that they won’t spend > considerable effort to spy on me. > > Maybe I should not connect to the lesser day saint who tells me on and off > that I am with Satan and that he will prove that I watch porn. > > But my easygoing drinking buddy „live and let live“ would be a fitting > candidate for a freenet friend. :) Yeah. However I would connect to (former) church contacts, if they saw Freenet as a useful means to preserve freedom and help the persecuted church to exchange sensitive data. Even though I disagree with them in spectacular fashion. Of course most of them probably think Freenet is a haven for paedophiles...
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