On 30/11/15 15:44, Florent Daigniere wrote: > On Mon, 2015-11-30 at 15:29 +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote: >> We have several major problems: >> 1. We need a major injection of cash. >> 2. We will not have a big connected darknet any time soon. >> 3. Opennet is not secure unless users pay for introduction. >> 4. Opennet is slow because of lowest common denominator load. >> >> I propose: Freenet Rebooted. >> >> A Kickstarter, but based on extending the current code, not a full >> rewrite. A lot of it actually works reasonably well. >> >> MAJOR CHANGES: >> 1. Darknet enhancements, but we recognise that we will need a large, >> fast opennet backbone to connect the darknet pockets for the time >> being. >> 2. You can only run a Full Opennet Node if you have an Opennet Invite >> and meet bandwidth/performance requirements. >> 3. Only Full Opennet Nodes route tunnels and/or high HTL traffic. >> 4. There may be further restrictions for security reasons, if so we >> will >> ensure that an OI still gives performance benefits (even if you are >> not >> routing traffic). >> 5. Opennet tunnels via ShadowWalker. >> 6. Better seednodes. >> 7. Most of the enhancements to other areas we've previously >> discussed. >> 8. Transient mode reintroduced, so opennet Freenet is still free as >> in >> beer, and secure with tunnels. Great for uploading on the run! But >> transient nodes don't route traffic/tunnels and get lower >> performance. >> 9. Investigate hardware partners and home-server UI issues. Long term >> we >> need cheap, convenient hardware nodes, because we need uptime. >> >> Initially we aim to raise $1M. Anyone who donates $100 gets an >> Opennet >> Invite, so this is 10,000 users. Hardware nodes might be a good donor >> perk too. In future we anticipate charging for OI's, but expect an >> increasing proportion to be provably given to other worthwhile, >> respected and relevant charities e.g. EFF: The price paid to become >> part >> of the network infrastructure is mainly a deterrent to large scale >> attacks, rather than a means of raising revenue. >> >> Thoughts? > This assumes that Sybil is the only attack against opennet... which is > clearly misleading. Sybil is the obvious, cheap attack; the nastier > ones are all those related to "open" topologies and protocols: > partitioning attacks, correlation attacks, ... for which we don't have > solutions either. > > Florent You mean for denial of service? Or for identifying users?
If we have scarcity then we can use ShadowWalker tunnels to prevent identifying users (on arguably naive but quantified assumptions - it works up to 20%), although granted there may be possibilities for active attacks. Direct DoS attacks against opennet announcement are also a lot easier to deal with.
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