On Mon, 2015-11-30 at 15:50 +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote: > On 30/11/15 15:44, Florent Daigniere wrote: > > On Mon, 2015-11-30 at 15:29 +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote: > > > Thoughts? > > This assumes that Sybil is the only attack against opennet... which > > is > > clearly misleading. Sybil is the obvious, cheap attack; the nastier > > ones are all those related to "open" topologies and protocols: > > partitioning attacks, correlation attacks, ... for which we don't > > have > > solutions either. > > > > Florent > You mean for denial of service? Or for identifying users? > > If we have scarcity then we can use ShadowWalker tunnels to prevent > identifying users (on arguably naive but quantified assumptions - it > works up to 20%), although granted there may be possibilities for > active > attacks. Direct DoS attacks against opennet announcement are also a > lot > easier to deal with.
Yes, active attacks is what I'm talking about here; If you knock off parts of the network (or make them unreachable for your target) you're doing a partitioning attack... and tunnels don't help you (because even if you manage to detect it you won't accept hard-fail - the secure behaviour). This is a problem that doesn't have any real-solution, just bad trade- offs. For the sake of giving an example: Bitcoin has the same problem. Florent PS: correlation attacks are way easier on a partitioned network for obvious reasons _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [email protected] https://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
