On 30/11/15 19:21, Florent Daigniere wrote: > On Mon, 2015-11-30 at 15:50 +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote: >> On 30/11/15 15:44, Florent Daigniere wrote: >>> On Mon, 2015-11-30 at 15:29 +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote: >>>> Thoughts? >>> This assumes that Sybil is the only attack against opennet... which >>> is >>> clearly misleading. Sybil is the obvious, cheap attack; the nastier >>> ones are all those related to "open" topologies and protocols: >>> partitioning attacks, correlation attacks, ... for which we don't >>> have >>> solutions either. >>> >>> Florent >> You mean for denial of service? Or for identifying users? >> >> If we have scarcity then we can use ShadowWalker tunnels to prevent >> identifying users (on arguably naive but quantified assumptions - it >> works up to 20%), although granted there may be possibilities for >> active >> attacks. Direct DoS attacks against opennet announcement are also a >> lot >> easier to deal with. > Yes, active attacks is what I'm talking about here; If you knock off > parts of the network (or make them unreachable for your target) you're > doing a partitioning attack... and tunnels don't help you (because even > if you manage to detect it you won't accept hard-fail - the secure > behaviour).
Not in every case. E.g. a seednode attempting to capture new announcees is a classic partition attack, but it's fixable by using other seeds and some consensus protocols etc. For which making identity generation expensive is very useful. > This is a problem that doesn't have any real-solution, just bad trade- > offs. For the sake of giving an example: Bitcoin has the same problem. > > Florent > PS: correlation attacks are way easier on a partitioned network for > obvious reasons
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