Ian Clarke <ian.clarke at gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Aug 14, 2008 at 7:14 PM, Matthew Toseland > <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org> wrote: >> On Friday 15 August 2008 00:42, Ian Clarke wrote: >>> What is the point in that? If they are intent on using Freenet, then >>> forcing them to select an inappropriate option doesn't make them any >>> more secure! >> >> The point is not to give them a false sense of security, and to make it clear >> that their security is reduced if they do need opennet. > > Both of these are about conveying information, not restricting > behavior. Your goal seems to be to (futilely) restrict the user's > behavior, not just to inform them.
The way I see it, the paranoia selector is simply an easy way to select certain bundles of options, e.g.: High == opennet off, foaf off, extra encryption on, etc Medium == opennet on, foaf on, extra encryption on, etc Low == opennet on, foaf on, extra encryption off, etc (Like the way ZoneAlarm and Internet Explorer do it.) There could also be a Custom level where experts can select the options individually. If you select High and then try to set opennet on, you'll see that your selector drops from High to Medium or Custom, because opennet on implies security level is no longer High. That's not a behavior restriction, that's just a fact. I think it also makes sense to phrase it in terms of security level settings rather than personal situation settings because someone in a non-life-threatening situation might nonetheless choose to run High security (and vice versa). theo
