Matthew Toseland wrote: > As a parallel option for introduction, a hashcash-protected global > announcement queue? > > Say KSK,23 at blah is a KSK protected by hashcash (this key type is > implementible, the catch is that you may get a collision and then you have to > find another slot and recompute). > > Then as an opt-in, and with a configurable hashcash strength, WoT nodes could > poll a single global introduction queue. They would announce which strength > queues they poll. > > This would ensure that everyone who wants to can see every new identity as it > is announced, and form their own opinion of it. > > When it gets spammed, the hash strength can be increased. Obviously hashcash > is not a real solution on its own. > > Would this satisfy the anti-WoT-censorship folk, or at least appease them to > some degree? > > Also, it would cut the time taken to get announced: once the hashcash is > solved and the key posted, we don't need to wait 24 hours for an > acknowledgement. > > Drawbacks: > - Excludes users with slow systems. > - Limited deterrent to a determined attacker. > - Might need native hashcash cracking libraries? OTOH the hashes are > implemented in native code anyway by the JVM, so maybe not. > > Advantages: > - With the current system, if an identity is marked as spam early on, many > people won't see it. Whereas if you can announce to a large number of people > at once, and have each evaluate your posts individually, this may avoid some > of the effects the anti-wot-censorship lobby are complaining about. > - Useful emergency fallback should the captchas be broken. > > Sensible? Stupid? > > Also, what about an option for ignoring the WoT's opinion until a newbie has > posted at least N messages, or M time has elapsed? > > I can't comment on the technical part because I wouldnt know what im talking about. However, I do like the 'social' part (being able to see an identity even if the censors mark it down it right away as it's created)
As for the two main problems, I realize that it wouldn't help against a powerful attacker , and discriminating against users who have cheap/old systems IS a problem, especially considering that such systems are relatively common in the places where Freenet is most needed. On the other hand tho, if a user knows that it will take his system three days or a week to finish the job, he may decide to do it anyway. I mean the real problem is 'not knowing' that it may take a long time. A user that starts a process and doesnt see any noticeable progress would probably abort, but the same user would let it run to completion if he expects it to take several days. Another problem is: would a low-end system still be usable during the process? an operation that takes 6 days to complete but still leaves the box usable for, say surfing the web and read/write e-mail, would be way better than having the same operation complete in 2 days but leaving the user unable to surf, read, etc. OK, I cut it here before I say _too_ many stupid things. Thx for addressing this problem, I appreciate that.
