> One problem with the yubikey thing is it takes time to deliver them. > Hence the need to be able to just buy an invite e.g. with BTC.
I agree that yubikey can't be the only way to introduce core nodes. There should be a (near) instant method as well. > On the level of tunnels - what I would consider real security - it's > a major unsolved problem in academia. (Tunnel setup on DHTs) I'm probably speaking out of my ass now (I promise to read more on it), but isn't the whole problem here that on DHTs, nodes don't have access to the complete node pool, so attacker can influence a set of nodes chosen for the tunnel, making compromised nodes progressively more likely to be chosen? If this is correct, can't we just side-step this problem by keeping full node tables in all bootstrap nodes? For a million nodes and 1K structure per node (which is probably an upper estimate), it's just 1G total. I think it can easily be fully distributed (i.e., without any partitioning) over a set of bootstrap nodes; when new core nodes contact bootstrap nodes, bootstrap nodes collectively produce whatever bootstrap information is required (set of node references for tunneling, location, etc), and update node information in their tables (like IP address, last seen time, etc). >>> If you trust your friends less than you trust the jack-boots, >>> then you probably don't have much to fear from the jack-boots. >> >> As I'd mentioned in a previous email, it's not a question of trust >> as is, it's a question of damage my friend can do to me if he >> decides to betray my trust. > > No. If they can prove that a given IP address at a given time > uploaded a given illegal file, game over. Or downloaded it, but > uploaders are worth more. That's the only safe assumption. Then neither darknet nor (current) opennet can work - at all. Basically, I'm trusting my friends to not disclose that I'm running Freenet - but no more than that. >> I still don't get why it happens. Are torrent clients run by >> significantly different slice of users? Again: I can reliably >> demonstrate speeds of *at least* 500 KB/s for any torrent with 10+ >> peers; with 20 peers, 90% of torrents, taken from all over the >> world, will max out my internet connection. This indicates average >> upload speeds of at least 50 KB/s, and probably closer to 100 KB/s >> (and with most connections being asymmetric in one way or another, >> we can safely assume that upload bandwidth is the limiting >> factor). > > Because torrent traffic is more bursty than Freenet? I.e. most of the > time they are idle? It's one possible explanation. I wonder if we can get a distribution of traffic on a node over the applications accessing it? Can I find out somehow how much physical traffic is associated with, i.e., FMS? This would be a very interesting stat, IMO. VD.
