On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 6:04 AM Dave Crocker <d...@dcrocker.net> wrote:
> On 8/12/2020 5:55 AM, Neil Anuskiewicz wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 5:13 AM Dave Crocker <d...@dcrocker.net > > <mailto:d...@dcrocker.net>> wrote: > > > > On 8/12/2020 4:45 AM, Neil Anuskiewicz wrote: > > > Mr. Crocker, is there a document that describes some of these > > proposals > > > and perhaps the best arguments for an against somewhere? The > > firehose of > > > learning would a bit easier if there were a FAQ. I think it might > > even > > > help the participants if this was all documented. Yes, I know > > there's > > > the archived but I mean an organized and linear doc. > > > > > > > > If you have particular questions, ask them. > > > > > > I've just recently started lurking but I think this is a discussion > > about semantics. What to call a proposed RFC5322.Sender field. > > The reference to field name was for an alternative to the rfc5322.From > field, not sender. > > Ah, an alternative way for DMARC to come into alignment: RFC5322.Sender == RFC5322.From so if tag is present permitting this alternative means of alignment. With the tag present, the receiving system checks the DNS of the RFC5322.Sender domain. If the tag isn't present, it's business as usual. My opinion is that having more ways to come into alignment available's a good thing. I work mostly with small businesses that don't have zillions of mail streams and moving parts. But DMARC sometimes finds rogue senders within the organization (The Toledo office decided to do their own marketing or Bob in sales is gonna make everything happen), legit senders who aren't authenticated, mail streams everyone forgot about, and, occasionally spoofers. Even with a small business, turning the policy knob above none is unnerving, especially if there's less than perfecto authentication across the board on legit sources. I rarely go above none anyway but I do like the option. > > The problem being addressed is the munging of headers by mailing lists > > and other forwarders, breaking things like DKIM. > > mailing lists pretty much always break DKIM. One of the proposals is to > try to recover signature validation, post hoc. > > > I've not been lurking long enough to grok what's going on but I'll > > continue to lurk and learn, eventually finding a small way to contribute > > to this effort even if it's just to sweep out the IETF Ashram. :-) > > > Welcome aboard. > > d/ > > > -- > Dave Crocker > Brandenburg InternetWorking > bbiw.net >
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