> On Apr 15, 2023, at 4:21 PM, Scott Kitterman <skl...@kitterman.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On April 15, 2023 10:58:06 PM UTC, Neil Anuskiewicz 
>> <neil=40marmot-tech....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>>> On Apr 14, 2023, at 8:26 PM, Scott Kitterman <skl...@kitterman.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Perfect.  The goal is working towards consensus is to find something we 
>>> can 
>>> live with, so that's exactly what I was hoping for.  I don't think it's 
>>> ideal 
>>> either, but I can live with it.
>>> 
>>> Scott K
>> 
>> Yes sir, that’s it. However, I’d like to see less of some narratives in the 
>> discussion especially around costs and benefits. It’s not you, Scott, but 
>> your post seems apropos.
>> 
>> 1. Cousin domains. We all get that dmarc doesn’t touch those. Dmarc is to 
>> stop spoofing of exact domains. There are other technologies and methods 
>> whose responsibility it is to track down and take down fraudsters.
>> 
>> 2. I would like to know if general purpose domain == org domain in most 
>> cases. Someone suggested the registration of a separate domain for general 
>> purposes. That sounds reasonable as long as the advice is clear that this 
>> isn’t advocating cousin domains.
>> 
>> 3. Dmarc should be made to work is as well as possibility to prevent exact 
>> domain spoofing. I’ve seen spoofing of org domains of companies that you 
>> wouldn’t think of as a high priority impact. It can cause catastrophic 
>> consequences to the organization so spoofed. I don’t have to say more here 
>> as presumably everyone here knows. If you don’t I think it’s critical to 
>> understand that. If you can’t feel it emotionally then you’ve not explored 
>> the consequences of spoofing.
>> 
>> So I humbly request a practice of steal manning and dispense with the straw 
>> men and especially the red herrings.
>> 
> What color herrings would you prefer?
> 
> I really have no idea what that last paragraph means.
> 
> If we can stick to trying to get some consensus on the MUSTard in the main 
> part of the document, I think we can (and should) address details in the 
> appendix the proposed language suggests we point to.
> 
> Dude, I have literally worked on email authentication for 20 years.  Do you 
> think I did that without understanding it's a problem?
> 

Scott, I said it wasn’t your posts that had those problems. See above. I 
responded to you with this as I see you as the person who is going to actually 
write the compromise text in the actual document. I meant no disrespect, Scott. 
I know who you are from SPF fame on.

I was just seeing arguments that not much benefit has been seen from enforcing 
policies not to mention cousin domains and so on. I get the feeling that 
position is from someone who’s never witnessed the consequences of malicious 
spoofing.

So I apologize, Scott, I neglected to explain my concerns.

Neil
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