On 22/04/2026 19:55, [email protected] wrote:
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-to-historic-00.txt is now available. It is a work item of the Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC) WG of the IETF.Title: Reclassifying ARC as Historic Authors: J. Trent Adams John Levine Name: draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-to-historic-00.txt Pages: 9 Dates: 2026-04-22
There appears to be room for improvement in the analysis. Section 3.1 states that "ARC required evaluators to run a reputation system for ARC signers." This is not accurate. The only occurrence of the term "reputation" in the ARC specification is in Section 7.1.2, where it notes that a site /may/ apply reputation-based filtering. There is no requirement for evaluators to operate such a system. Section 3.2 is titled "ARC’s Core Lesson: Signatures Are Not Trust". However, DMARC itself relies on trusting authenticated identifiers, whether established via cryptographic signatures or IP-based mechanisms. For direct messages, this model is generally effective. There is a qualitative difference, however, when identity is asserted transitively (e.g., in forwarding scenarios): authentication alone does not convey the same level of trust. Informally, when an entity proves its own identity, this can be seen as a kind of “fixed point” of the trust function; this property does not hold when identity is asserted on behalf of a third party. More generally, the use of signatures should be considered within a broader authentication and authorization framework. Internet email has historically operated without mandatory authentication, and with an implicit authorization model in which any sender can attempt delivery to any recipient without prior arrangement. This openness is a core property of the system. Forwarding, by contrast, introduces third-party assertions of identity, where this implicit authorization model no longer applies cleanly. The draft does not address this distinction, which is significant. There may be a partial parallel with earlier attempts to address mediated message flows, such as Sender ID in relation to SPF. In both cases, mechanisms were introduced to extend authentication semantics beyond direct delivery, and the resulting difficulties appear to arise less from the underlying cryptography than from the complexity of the trust model. However, the comparison is not exact, as ARC operates as an extension to DKIM rather than a reinterpretation of identity. Best Ale -- _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
