On 24/04/2026 03:24, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Thu, Apr 23, 2026 at 8:04 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:
Section 3.1 states that "ARC required evaluators to run a reputation
system for ARC signers." This is not accurate. The only occurrence of the
term "reputation" in the ARC specification is in Section 7.1.2, where it
notes that a site /may/ apply reputation-based filtering. There is no
requirement for evaluators to operate such a system.
I would assume what's meant here is that ARC is only truly valuable if you
develop some kind of reputation for "good" or "bad" actors in the ARC
chain. Without that, ARC's value is arguably limited.
I think that interpretation is reasonable as an operational observation,
but it is not reflected in the specification itself. The ARC trust
model is intentionally left unspecified, and does not mandate (or even
define) a reputation system. Framing ARC as depending on a notional or
external reputation system risks overstating what the protocol actually
requires or guarantees.
(The same argument applies to DKIM.)
I’m not sure the comparison with DKIM holds. DKIM provides a verifiable
binding to a domain identifier, and its use within DMARC is based on
identifier alignment rather than any explicit notion of signer reputation.
Section 3.2 is titled "ARC’s Core Lesson: Signatures Are Not Trust".
However, DMARC itself relies on trusting authenticated identifiers, whether
established via cryptographic signatures or IP-based mechanisms. For
direct messages, this model is generally effective. There is a qualitative
difference, however, when identity is asserted transitively (e.g., in
forwarding scenarios): authentication alone does not convey the same level
of trust. Informally, when an entity proves its own identity, this can be
seen as a kind of “fixed point” of the trust function; this property does
not hold when identity is asserted on behalf of a third party.
I'm not sure I understand the claim here. A DMARC "pass" is not
predicated on trust (unless you only say DKIM passes for trusted entities,
for instance). I mean, it could be, but the protocol doesn't require it
(and how could it?).
Perhaps “trust” is not the most precise term here. What I meant is that
a DMARC “pass” typically contributes positively to a message’s
evaluation (e.g., reducing its score). While this is not a normative
requirement of the protocol, it is a common operational consequence of
successful authentication.
The distinction I was trying to draw is between direct authentication
(an entity asserting its own identity) and transitive assertions (an
intermediary asserting something about a prior hop). The latter does
not carry the same semantics, even if the underlying mechanism (a
signature) is similar.
More generally, the use of signatures should be considered within a broader
authentication and authorization framework. Internet email has
historically operated without mandatory authentication, and with an
implicit authorization model in which any sender can attempt delivery to
any recipient without prior arrangement. This openness is a core property
of the system. Forwarding, by contrast, introduces third-party assertions
of identity, where this implicit authorization model no longer applies
cleanly.
If I configure this email address to forward elsewhere, does Gmail make any
assertions about any identity in the message (apart from, say, its own DKIM
signature)? I don't think that's ever true, much less generally true.
In practice, forwarders do make operational choices that affect how
identity is presented. For example, Gmail sets the HELO identity to an
internal identity when forwarding messages and, more importantly, tries
not to break author domain signatures. Forwarders have to behave in
ways that resemble direct senders, because there is no standardized
mechanism for conveying authorizations across hops.
Regarding the DKIM2 approach, I’m not convinced it fully addresses the
issue. Tracing differences across hops can improve transparency, but by
itself it does not establish meaningful constraints on what
intermediaries are allowed to change. In the absence of a well-defined
and enforceable set of permitted transformations, an intermediary could
in principle replace the entire message while still providing a complete
and internally consistent trace of those changes. Since the end
recipient has no baseline for comparison, such tracing does not, on its
own, provide assurance about the semantic integrity of the original
content. In that sense, the problem appears analogous to ARC: without
an accompanying authorization or policy framework, recording
transformations does not by itself establish trust in them.
Best
Ale
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