On 28/04/2026 19:01, John R Levine wrote:
On Tue, 28 Apr 2026, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
Sometimes. My wife and I have forwarding addresses at our universities, and I have one at the IEEE ([email protected].) They all used to handle the forwarding themselves, but over the years they outsourced it. Yale outsourced to Google, Cornell to Microsoft. The IEEE has a strange system where the mail goes to Google, is relayed to an IEEE server at AWS, and is then reinjected into Google to send back out.

When a forwarder moves, frequently without telling the forward recipients, whose job is it to update your users' configuration?

If the user’s configuration is tied to a stable identifier such as a List-ID,

Um, I think it should be self-evident that those forwarders are not mailing lists.


Agreed. It is also self-evident that those forwarders did not obtain any form of explicit authorization from receivers when they set up their forwarding behavior.

That seems to be the underlying issue: we have authentication mechanisms, but no corresponding authorization model for intermediaries like forwarders.

IMHO, an authorization protocol should provide a stable identifier for this kind of forwarding role, analogous (in spirit) to List-ID for mailing lists. Without something along those lines, receivers have no principled way to distinguish legitimate forwarding from unauthorized mediation.

Perhaps this is getting into design details, but it relates directly to the analysis of ARC failures: focusing on authentication alone overlooks that authentication without authorization is of limited value —arguably only sufficient for direct (non-mediated) delivery.

Best
Ale
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