On 27/04/2026 15:52, Todd Herr wrote:
On Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 2:12 PM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:
On 24/04/2026 03:24, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Thu, Apr 23, 2026 at 8:04 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:
Section 3.2 is titled "ARC’s Core Lesson: Signatures Are Not Trust".
However, DMARC itself relies on trusting authenticated identifiers, whether
established via cryptographic signatures or IP-based mechanisms. For
direct messages, this model is generally effective. There is a qualitative
difference, however, when identity is asserted transitively (e.g., in
forwarding scenarios): authentication alone does not convey the same level
of trust. Informally, when an entity proves its own identity, this can be
seen as a kind of “fixed point” of the trust function; this property does
not hold when identity is asserted on behalf of a third party.
I'm not sure I understand the claim here. A DMARC "pass" is not
predicated on trust (unless you only say DKIM passes for trusted entities,
for instance). I mean, it could be, but the protocol doesn't require it
(and how could it?).
Perhaps “trust” is not the most precise term here. What I meant is that
a DMARC “pass” typically contributes positively to a message’s
evaluation (e.g., reducing its score). While this is not a normative
requirement of the protocol, it is a common operational consequence of
successful authentication.
The notion that a DMARC "pass" typically contributes positively to a
message's evaluation is not only not a normative requirement of the
protocol, it is in fact contrary to the text of both RFC 7489 and DMARCbis.
RFC 7489 includes this text in the Abstract section:
"DMARC does not produce or encourage elevated delivery privilege of
authenticated email."
DMARCbis, meanwhile, contains this text in the Introduction section:
"A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author
Domain has been validated for that message as authorized by the Domain
Owner. Such authorization does not carry an explicit or implicit value
assertion about that message or about the Domain Owner, and so a DMARC pass
by itself does not guarantee that delivery to the recipient's Inbox would
be safe or desirable."
A DMARC pass allows one to evaluate the current message in the context of
the authenticated identity's previous message sending history, but it does
not and should not, by itself, ascribe a positive value to a message.
I agree that neither RFC 7489 nor DMARCbis assigns any intrinsic
positive value to a DMARC “pass”, and that such a result does not by
itself justify favorable handling.
My point was about how authentication results are used in practice as
inputs to local evaluation, independently of any notion of domain
reputation.
Even in the absence of historical data (e.g., on smaller sites), a
validated, aligned author-domain signature can still serve as a
meaningful signal: it confirms that the domain in the visible identifier
has participated in the authentication of the message. This is distinct
from reputation, which may amplify or override that signal when available.
The distinction I was trying to draw is between first-party
authentication and transitive assertions. When a domain authenticates
its own mail, the identifier is directly bound to the originating actor.
In contrast, when identity is conveyed via intermediaries (e.g.,
forwarding scenarios with third-party signatures), that direct binding
is not present, and the same kind of signal is not available.
Best
Ale
--
_______________________________________________
dmarc mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]