The presumed success of DKIM2, as a solution for the mailing list problem,
is the incentive for terminating ARC.  Therforee, it is relevant and
appropriate to define that path.


   - At minimum, all p=reject domains for a specific mailing list must
   choose to implement DKIM2
   - The mailing list detects that all p=reject domains which are eligible
   for posting have switched to DKIM2.  This becomes its incentive to
   implement DKIM2 as well.
   - The mailing list implements DKIM2, including definition of its
   transforms.
   - Recipient domains that currently enforce p=reject must understand
   DKIM2 and trust the transformations made by the mailing list.
   - The mailing list collects data to confirm that all subscribers are now
   willing to accept its transforms.
   - The mailing list is now able to stop munging the From address, as long
   as:
      - New subscribers must agree to accept the DKIM2 transforms.
      - New subscribers with p=reject must implement DKIM2 before making
      posts.
      - Existing subscribers must implement DKIM2 before switching from
      p=none to p=reject, or they will lose the right to make posts.

Analysis
Multiple parts of this process assume actions that are inconsistent with
our experience to date/

   - ARC can be implemented at the server level by the server
   organization.   DKIM2 must be implemented by the Mailing List Management
   software, and the implementation is more complex.
   - Implementing DKIM2 as an alternative to munging requires the list to
   put restrictions on new subscribers, something they have seemed unwilling
   to do so far.
   - DKIM2 requires recipient email filters to maintain a list of trusted
   mailing lists, so that those DKIM2 transforms can be accepted.   This also
   has been difficult to achieve to date.
   - Mailing lists need to collect data about the security posture of their
   recipients, something that requires some effort and has not had visible
   uptake so far.

Hence, I conclude that DKIM2 will not solve the mailing list problem.
 Evaluating whether it will solve another important problem would require
the same level of analysis, not blind faith.

DKIM2 does not provide a way to identify mailing list traffic that is a
malicious impersonation of a non-DKIM2 domain.   ARC did address that
problem, by rewarding mailing lists that enforced authentication and
documented that action.

DKIM2 does not help ESPs like Constant Contact or Otter.AI.   These
organizations must continue to mung the From address.

DKIM2 may solve the general problem of malicious impersonation, but only if
all legitimate participants implement it.  We have had trouble getting any
new protocol universally implemented by legitimate participants.

Time to get our heads out of the clouds.

Doug Foster
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