The mailing list problem has always been an evaluator problem.   An
evaluator who wants to met the needs of his user needs to figure out which
lists can be trusted and then allow all traffic from the list.

An alternate approach is to declare the list to be too risky, and block all
traffic from the list.   Users can participate from personal Gmail accounts
on personal devices, as a fallback.

The only strategy that makes no sense is allowing some traffic because
authentication failure is ignored, while blocking some traffic because
authentication is not ignored.

But since the mailing list problem is really considered the AOL problem, do
we know that AOL is on board with DKIM2?

On Fri, May 15, 2026, 10:51 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Thu 14/May/2026 23:56:08 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
> > In message <CAH48Zfy=jTP3VA_WwYDcEm=BE4hzhOqywSGFwZNDqCzYq=+=
> [email protected]>, Douglas Foster <[email protected]>
> writes
> > [...]
> >>    * DKIM2 requires recipient email filters to maintain a list of
> >>      trusted mailing lists, so that those DKIM2 transforms can be
> >>      accepted.   This also has been difficult to achieve to date.
> >
> > I expect that mailbox providers will apply heuristics as the type (and
> > scale) of recipes that they will deem appropriate. Note that the
> > exploded flag allows identification of mailing lists, which current
> > systems do not do  (yes, I know about List-* header field, but I have
> > done enough analysis of what is seen on incoming email at scale to know
> > that they are of little practical use at that scale)
>
>
> This is where I lose track of the reasoning.  How can a protocol rely on
> unspecified heuristics to decide whether to override a domain's published
> policy?
>
> Let me connect this to the upcoming DMARC update. It says that domains
> whose
> users post to mailing lists "SHOULD NOT publish p=reject".  That is
> clearly a
> limitation.  However, the use of SHOULD rather than MUST suggests that the
> mailing-list problem is expected to become solvable eventually.  Otherwise
> there would be no path toward universal deployment of p=reject.
>
> Now consider a message from a domain publishing p=reject.  The message is
> exploded by a mailing list and modified in transit.  The mailbox provider
> must
> then decide, precisely, whether to accept or reject it.
>
> I do not see how f=exploded changes the situation fundamentally.  It can
> be
> asserted as arbitrarily as List-Id:, and it does not establish that the
> modified message still preserves the semantics of the author's signed
> text.
> Therefore I do not see how dmarc=pass could legitimately result merely
> from the
> presence of f=exploded plus analysis of the modifications. In that
> respect, the
> situation seems very similar to ARC.
>
> The only non-omniscient criterion I can think of for overriding the
> author's
> policy is explicit authorization.  That is, the forwarder or mailing list
> must
> be authorized for that specific list and that specific recipient.
> Reputation
> is not enough.
>
> The DKIM2 draft appears to move in this direction when it mentions a
> committing
> entity "providing a contractually arranged service".  But does that notion
> extend to ordinary mailing-list subscriptions?  If so, how is the mailbox
> provider expected to obtain and validate that authorization information?
>
>
> Best
> Ale
> --
>
>
>
>
>
>
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