On Thu 14/May/2026 23:56:08 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
In message <CAH48Zfy=jTP3VA_WwYDcEm=BE4hzhOqywSGFwZNDqCzYq=+=o...@mail.gmail.com>,
Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
[...]
* DKIM2 requires recipient email filters to maintain a list of
trusted mailing lists, so that those DKIM2 transforms can be
accepted. This also has been difficult to achieve to date.
I expect that mailbox providers will apply heuristics as the type (and
scale) of recipes that they will deem appropriate. Note that the
exploded flag allows identification of mailing lists, which current
systems do not do (yes, I know about List-* header field, but I have
done enough analysis of what is seen on incoming email at scale to know
that they are of little practical use at that scale)
This is where I lose track of the reasoning. How can a protocol rely on
unspecified heuristics to decide whether to override a domain's published policy?
Let me connect this to the upcoming DMARC update. It says that domains whose
users post to mailing lists "SHOULD NOT publish p=reject". That is clearly a
limitation. However, the use of SHOULD rather than MUST suggests that the
mailing-list problem is expected to become solvable eventually. Otherwise
there would be no path toward universal deployment of p=reject.
Now consider a message from a domain publishing p=reject. The message is
exploded by a mailing list and modified in transit. The mailbox provider must
then decide, precisely, whether to accept or reject it.
I do not see how f=exploded changes the situation fundamentally. It can be
asserted as arbitrarily as List-Id:, and it does not establish that the
modified message still preserves the semantics of the author's signed text.
Therefore I do not see how dmarc=pass could legitimately result merely from the
presence of f=exploded plus analysis of the modifications. In that respect, the
situation seems very similar to ARC.
The only non-omniscient criterion I can think of for overriding the author's
policy is explicit authorization. That is, the forwarder or mailing list must
be authorized for that specific list and that specific recipient. Reputation
is not enough.
The DKIM2 draft appears to move in this direction when it mentions a committing
entity "providing a contractually arranged service". But does that notion
extend to ordinary mailing-list subscriptions? If so, how is the mailbox
provider expected to obtain and validate that authorization information?
Best
Ale
--
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