On Thu 14/May/2026 23:56:08 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
In message <CAH48Zfy=jTP3VA_WwYDcEm=BE4hzhOqywSGFwZNDqCzYq=+=o...@mail.gmail.com>, 
Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
[...]
* DKIM2 requires recipient email filters to maintain a list of trusted mailing lists, so that those DKIM2 transforms can be accepted. This also has been difficult to achieve to date.

I expect that mailbox providers will apply heuristics as the type (and scale) of recipes that they will deem appropriate. Note that the exploded flag allows identification of mailing lists, which current systems do not do (yes, I know about List-* header field, but I have done enough analysis of what is seen on incoming email at scale to know that they are of little practical use at that scale)


This is where I lose track of the reasoning. How can a protocol rely on unspecified heuristics to decide whether to override a domain's published policy?

Let me connect this to the upcoming DMARC update. It says that domains whose users post to mailing lists "SHOULD NOT publish p=reject". That is clearly a limitation. However, the use of SHOULD rather than MUST suggests that the mailing-list problem is expected to become solvable eventually. Otherwise there would be no path toward universal deployment of p=reject.

Now consider a message from a domain publishing p=reject. The message is exploded by a mailing list and modified in transit. The mailbox provider must then decide, precisely, whether to accept or reject it.

I do not see how f=exploded changes the situation fundamentally. It can be asserted as arbitrarily as List-Id:, and it does not establish that the modified message still preserves the semantics of the author's signed text. Therefore I do not see how dmarc=pass could legitimately result merely from the presence of f=exploded plus analysis of the modifications. In that respect, the situation seems very similar to ARC.

The only non-omniscient criterion I can think of for overriding the author's policy is explicit authorization. That is, the forwarder or mailing list must be authorized for that specific list and that specific recipient. Reputation is not enough.

The DKIM2 draft appears to move in this direction when it mentions a committing entity "providing a contractually arranged service". But does that notion extend to ordinary mailing-list subscriptions? If so, how is the mailbox provider expected to obtain and validate that authorization information?


Best
Ale
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