In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, David Conrad writes: > [cc's cleaned up] > > Hi, > > > At his point, I will sit quietly for a while and let the WG comment > > on whether they think that your proposed > > alternative mitigation is adequate. On Friday, the WG chairs will > > gauge consensus and I will take appropriate action. > > Given the stunningly successful implementation of BCP038 over the 8 > years since it has been published, I believe relying on it as a > mitigation strategy against open resolver attacks is simply silly and > discussing it largely a waste of time.
While I encourage everyone to deploy BCP 38, wherever possible, I don't believe we should be relying on BCP 38 deployment to prevent recursive servers being abused. Mark -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED] _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
