On 21 Aug 2018, at 16:23, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bert...@open-xchange.com> wrote: > > And I have yet to see a statement from the DoH community that Mozilla's idea > of making DoH the default and disregarding whatever resolver is being > configured in the system via DHCP is not a good one.
Why would/should the DoH community -- whatever that is -- make such a statement? In some cases, it will be better to use the current network’s resolving DNS servers. In others it won’t. For some definition of “better”. The use or non-use of DoH is somewhat orthogonal to those underlying considerations. Deciding what’s “good” or “bad" gets very messy very quickly. For instance I might decide to trust $coffeeshop’s resolver in my home town (say) but not at a branch of $coffeeshop that's behind the Great Firewall of China. Or $coffeeshop’s outlet in the foyer of my employer’s building. > Actually, during the discussions in Montreal there were people talking about > centralized DNS operators paying the browser makers to get their DNS traffic, > and then monetizing it to get back the money. How can this be presented as > "more privacy" is baffling. If this happens, it can be worked around. Almost nobody is going to be forced to use privacy-unfriendly browsers or resolvers at gunpoint. Besides, providers offering “even more privacy” will emerge if this centralisation/monetisation thing turns out to be a problem. Having low barriers to entry is one of the nice things about the Internet. Well OK, it’s a nice thing some of the time. :-) _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
