Bill Clark wrote: > Does anyone know of any additional analysis or research into the question > of how various election methods behave under an assumption of perfect > information? (And thanks to those who have already posted such > references.)
Please see Lorrie Cranor's work on Declared-Strategy Voting at http://lorrie.cranor.org/dsv.html Much of her dissertation is closely related to your line of thought. Unfortunately, plurality still suffers from the Duverger effect even when used with DSV. I'm currently working on DSV with approval voting and trying to show that it is much superior in many ways. ===== Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Small Business $15K Web Design Giveaway http://promotions.yahoo.com/design_giveaway/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
