Bill Clark wrote: > My immediate intuition was that while something like DSV+Plurality would > still result in two parties being dominant, *which* two parties those > were might be more subject to fluctuation, than with standard plurality.
Yes, there would be more fluctuation. Plurality DSV would effectively allow jumps between equilibria instead of keeping us mired in one two-party "equilibrium" as continuous polling and plain plurality do. In particular, if the sincere preferences are 45:Reagan>Anderson>Carter 20:Anderson>Carter>Reagan 35:Carter>Anderson>Reagan then there are three plurality equilibria (according to Philip Straffin in Game Theory and Strategy); one elects Carter with Reagan as the runner-up and the other two elect Anderson. Unfortunately, the Carter/Reagan equilibrium is the one most likely to be found by plurality DSV. Approval DSV is much more likely to find an Anderson equilibrium, especially given the best approval strategies. > I think there's some argument to be made that the USA should currently > have a two-party duopoly consisting of Greens/Republicans or > Democrats/Libertarians (or even Greens/Libertarians.) I guess Libertarians/Republicans is too much to hope for . . . > I'd be interested in reading more about that, when your work reaches a > point you're happy with. I trust you'll share with the list when you're > ready? :) Oh, absolutely. I'll announce all publications here. ===== Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Small Business $15K Web Design Giveaway http://promotions.yahoo.com/design_giveaway/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
