Rob LeGrand wrote: > Please see Lorrie Cranor's work on Declared-Strategy Voting at
> http://lorrie.cranor.org/dsv.html > Much of her dissertation is closely related to your line of thought. Indeed it is. Much thanks for the pointer! > Unfortunately, plurality still suffers from the Duverger effect even when > used with DSV. My immediate intuition was that while something like DSV+Plurality would still result in two parties being dominant, *which* two parties those were might be more subject to fluctuation, than with standard plurality. Part of the problem with the two-party system (as I see it) is that social inertia may keep one party in power long after it "should" have been replaced by some popular third-party. I think there's some argument to be made that the USA should currently have a two-party duopoly consisting of Greens/Republicans or Democrats/Libertarians (or even Greens/Libertarians.) Obviously I haven't had any time to give Lorrie Cranor's work anything more than a cursory glance, so I'm not sure whether my intuition in that regard matches with her results. > I'm currently working on DSV with approval voting and > trying to show that it is much superior in many ways. I'd be interested in reading more about that, when your work reaches a point you're happy with. I trust you'll share with the list when you're ready? :) -Bill -- Ralph Nader for US President in 2004 http://votenader.org/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
