On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, Ted Stern wrote:
Furthermore, the set P of all candidates none of which is beaten by any candidate with greater approval turns out to be the set of candidates that are as high or higher than the approval winner in the sorted order.
Seems nice, but why is this a nice property to have? Is there something special about it?
I recently suggested that the winner should be picked from this set P by random ballot.
This set P always includes the AW and the CW (when there is one), and in general some other relatively high approval candidates that are good at winning pairwise contests.
This set P is much more restrictive than the set Q of all candidates with beat paths to the AW, which I once proposed.
But I think P may be adequate to control most insincere voting, though it doesn't do as well as Q on the notorious
49 C 24 B>>A>C 27 A>B>>C
example.
For this example, using Jobst's Random Approval Ballot Order as the seed for bubble sort, and then picking (by random ballot) from the candidates that end up as high or higher than the AW, might do the job of discouraging truncation.
In any case this set P is independent from pareto dominated alternatives.
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