Dear Kevin! You wrote:
> Can ATLO make it so that given the following sincere preferences, the > B>C faction has no incentive to bullet vote? > > 49 A > 24 B>C > 27 C>B > > Under WV, the B>C voters can get B elected if they vote only for B, whereas > they give the election to C if they give C a ranking. DFC gives C 53%, B 47% probability of winning here, assuming all ranked candidates are approved of. > > My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the > defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following > ballots: > > 49 A > 24 B > 27 C>B I'm not sure whether your conclusion is true, but at least DFC again gives C 53%, B 47% probability of winning here, assuming all ranked candidates are approved of. Hence the B voters have no incentive to truncate. If the 27 vote C>>B, A gets elected with 100%, hence the C voters have incentive to approve of B also, which I consider a good thing. Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
