Dear Jobst,
--- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the
> > defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following
> > ballots:
> >
> > 49 A
> > 24 B
> > 27 C>B
>
> I'm not sure whether your conclusion is true, but at least DFC again
> gives C 53%, B 47% probability of winning here, assuming all ranked
> candidates are approved of. Hence the B voters have no incentive to
> truncate.
Don't they? Suppose there is one more voter who votes "C." Now if all the
B voters vote B>C, C wins 100% of the time under DFC, right?
> If the 27 vote C>>B, A gets elected with 100%, hence the C voters have
> incentive to approve of B also, which I consider a good thing.
So do I.
I should revise my claim slightly:
> > My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the
> > defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following
> > ballots:
> >
> > 49 A
> > 24 B(>C) <-- change is here
> > 27 C>B
Kevin Venzke
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