Mike, --- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > We've been hearing a lot about wv not meeting LNH (Later No Harm). As I've > many times pointed out on EM, the way that IRV protects your favorite from > being harmed by votes for your lower choices is, by elimnating your favorite > before it lets you help anyone else. I call that electoral euthanasia.
Of course, I'm not advocating an elimination method. > But LNH does have one use: It's one way of avoiding James' > co-operation/defection dilemma. But that problem can also be well dealt-with > via ATLO, and so there's no justification for giving up what needs to be > given up in order to get LNH, as a way of avoiding the > co-operation/defection dilemma. Really? Can ATLO make it so that given the following sincere preferences, the B>C faction has no incentive to bullet vote? 49 A 24 B>C 27 C>B Under WV, the B>C voters can get B elected if they vote only for B, whereas they give the election to C if they give C a ranking. My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following ballots: 49 A 24 B 27 C>B Kevin Venzke __________________________________________________________________ Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails ! Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info