Andrew Myers wrote: > Is there any stronger statement that can be made for strategic > immunity of specific completion methods, ideally ones that > satisfy the summability criterion?
Maybe your best bet would be to show that the general problem of manipulating a given election method by voting insincerely is NP- hard. See Bartholdi III, John J., Craig A. Tovey and Michael A. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227-241, 1989. -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
