Juho, --- Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > On point 3. I have also an extra comment. If sincere range voting > preferences are A:100, B:80, C:0 and the voter strategically votes > A:100, B:100, C:0, isn't that also one type of favourite betrayal that > weakens the position of the (small party) candidate A? The Electowiki > definition of FBC talks about "voting someone over his favourite", but > in range voting already making the gap between A and B smaller has > influence (unlike in ranking based methods) and could be considered a > "betrayal". And giving less support to small parties could lead to > 2-party domination.
There's a "strong" form of FBC in which it is betrayal even to rank some candidate equal to your favorite. But I don't know of any deterministic method which satisfies strong FBC. This doesn't worry me much. If at least voters never need to rank compromises *above* their favorites, this means voters can be at least as sincere as under Approval. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info