Hello Kevin,

Thanks for the reminder. I try to be careful in writing about the FBC. Or maybe I should write about any harm done to the favourite small party candidate (which could lead to 2-party domination) in a more general sense. In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination. But I'm also not very worried since the real (stronger, meaningful) reasons for 2-party domination are elsewhere, not in Condorcet or other slightly big party favouring rules (e.g. d'Hondt method).

BR, Juho

P.S. In range voting already voting A:100, B:90, C:0 would reduce the chances of A to win.

Juho,

--- Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
On point 3. I have also an extra comment. If sincere range voting
preferences are A:100, B:80, C:0 and the voter strategically votes
A:100, B:100, C:0, isn't that also one type of favourite betrayal that
weakens the position of the (small party) candidate A? The Electowiki
definition of FBC talks about "voting someone over his favourite", but
in range voting already making the gap between A and B smaller has
influence (unlike in ranking based methods) and could be considered a
"betrayal". And giving less support to small parties could lead to
2-party domination.

There's a "strong" form of FBC in which it is betrayal even to rank some
candidate equal to your favorite.

But I don't know of any deterministic method which satisfies strong FBC.

This doesn't worry me much. If at least voters never need to rank compromises *above* their favorites, this means voters can be at least as sincere as under
Approval.

Kevin Venzke



        

        
                
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