At 10:58 AM 9/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination.
It is interesting that this claim is made, not only by Mr. Laatu, but also by Mr. Smith with respect to ordinary Approval.
I see no reason to anticipate that. The net effect, compared to the present system, of Approval-style voting would seem to be to *equate* small parties with large ones, because at present there is a great deal of nose-holding least-of-two-evils voting. Approval will not remove the need for that kind of consideration, *but* the additional votes for third party candidates are *full* votes. In Range, there is a dilemma: either weaken the vote which is likely to be effective, or weaken the vote of the favorite not likely to win.
That full points are given to the small party candidate is, I think, a pressure in the opposite direction from 2-party domination.
It has been claimed that Range Voting shows more support for third-party candidates, based on the results of a poll conducted by Mr. Smith. However "more support" in this case means that some third party candidates were rated with a grade that would flunk them in just about any class, but because it was greater numerically than the vote percentage that they got under Plurality or Approval, it was considered "greater support."
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