On Sat, Nov 1, 2008 at 1:43 PM, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Situation I: > Voter 1: A favourite, C also approved > Voter 2: B favourite, C also approved > > If we interpret the approval information as an indication that the voters > like C better than tossing a coin between A and B, we would be tempted to > let the method match these voters and transfer both their winning > probabilities from their favourites to C. So C will win with certainty. > > But if we want monotonicity also, C must still win with certainty in the > following situation: > > Situation II: > Voter 1: C favourite, A also approved > Voter 2: B favourite, C also approved > > But in this situation, a matching algorithm would *not* match the voters > since voter 2 obviously does not seem to profit from such a transfer.
I wonder if you could do something like a blind auction. In effect, your winning probability is assigned based only on agreement. For example, Randomly pair up the voters with a randomly assigned compromise. Each voter offers to switch pair for a compromise that is better than current pair This causes a reassignment of the pairs The process is repeated until stable This means that a voter doesn't have to say who is their favourite. Ofc, offers near the start would likely use their favourite as compromise and slowly backtrack if it isn't accepted. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
