Hi, --- En date de : Mar 11.10.11, Warren Smith <warren....@gmail.com> a écrit : > I've done sim experiments indicating that range voting > finds > honest-voter Condorcet winners > more often than Condorcet methods do, if the voters are > strategic.
Though you have to be careful what you mean by "strategic." My own recent sims use an apples-to-apples method to determine strategic voting under each method (with all voters being strategic). I don't find Range/Approval/MCA/whatever to be relatively strong at sincere Condorcet efficiency most of the time. It's not that I don't find strategic voting to varying degrees under rank methods. (Although I see extremely few disaster scenarios, as voters, observing polls, seem to have no qualms about compromising to avert them.) It is probably due to this difference: In a left/right/center scenario it is completely possible that on election day, any one of those three candidates could be the sincere Condorcet Winner and be correctly elected under Condorcet or some other methods. But Approval, at least experimentally, can't handle three frontrunners on a spectrum. Either left or right is likely to lose their "exclusive" supporters, so that only two of the three candidates can actually win on election day. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info