Hi Jameson, --- En date de : Mar 11.10.11, Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> a écrit :
Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range if voters are strategic and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls. I'm curious whether you believe the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" claim based on Warren's IEVS work, or for some other reason. Because in IEVS, the polls, if we call them polls, provide arbitrary data. Nobody is actually polled. What do you say happens if Range voters are strategic but *not* knowledgeable? Does that mean they place their "approval cutoffs" potentially arbitrarily? If so, I think that would still beat all the rank methods with strategic but not- knowledgeable voters. In that situation every ballot's first preference could be nearly arbitrary, because in IEVS strategic rank voters *always* use compromise. Kevin Venzke
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