That's weaker than the FBC. The FBC says you shouldn't have to betray your favorite to get a result you prefer, not that you shouldn't have to betray your favorite to get your favorite.
To restate it in Kristofer's terms: Say an election elects X != Y. Now take a ballot which does not rate Y top or equal-top. There must be some way to replace that with a ballot which ranks Y top or equal-top and still get an election which elects either X or Y. That is, for any result you can get with favorite betrayal, either you can get that same result without favorite betrayal, or you can get your favorite without favorite betrayal. I do like having this "backwards" formulation of the criterion; it might make proving FBC easier in some cases. So thank you, Kristofer, for the idea. Jameson 2011/11/23 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_el...@lavabit.com> > Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> I don't agree that "Sincere Favorite" is practically equivalent to the >> FBC. The FBC is about not having to lower your one favorite candidate; it >> is not about not having to pick a single favorite from your favorite set. >> As a voter, I'd regard the former as a serious dilemma, and the latter as a >> trivial detail. >> > > Would this work as a votes-only variant of FBC? > > "If Y currently wins, then you shouldn't be able to make Y lose by > replacing some ballots where Y is ranked below top with ballots where Y is > ranked at top and the other candidates are in arbitrary order". > > That's a mirror image criterion: consider the ballots after modification > to be the voters' sincere ballots. Then the ballots before modification are > strategic ones where the voters in question compromised to get Y to win. If > the method passes FBC, the voters shouldn't have to alter their ballots in > any way that moves Y below top - and if a method passes this criterion, for > any pair of ballot sets that could be interpreted as this happening, Y wins > in both cases. > >
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