Hi Chris,
De : Chris Benham <cbenha...@yahoo.com.au> >>À : "fsimm...@pcc.edu" <fsimm...@pcc.edu> >>Cc : EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 7h08 >>Objet : [EM] An ABE solution >> It is certainly a clear proof of the incompatibilty of the Condorcet criterion and Kevin's later >>suggested "variation" of the FBC, "Sincere Favorite": >> Suppose a subset of the ballots, all identical, rank every candidate in S >>(where S contains at least two candidates) equal to each other, and above >>every other candidate. Then, arbitrarily lowering some candidate X from S on >>these ballots must not increase the probability that the winner comes from S. >>A simpler way to word this would be: You should never be able to help your >>favorites by lowering one of them. >> >>http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc >> >>I can't see any real difference between this and regular FBC, which probably >>partly explains >>why it didn't catch on. Sincere Favorite is supposed to be a votes-only translation of FBC. It should clarify what I am doing when I check whether a method satisfies FBC. It's possible that a method can satisfy FBC without satisfying Sincere Favorite, but it would be hard to design a method to do so, I think. Besides the issue you mention, there are also the facts that I rarely use the "sincere favorite" name myself and that the SF acronym would be confusing given the "Strategy-Free" criterion with the same initials. Kevin
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