2011/11/23 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_el...@lavabit.com> > Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> That's weaker than the FBC. The FBC says you shouldn't have to betray >> your favorite to get a result you prefer, not that you shouldn't have to >> betray your favorite to get your favorite. >> >> To restate it in Kristofer's terms: >> Say an election elects X != Y. Now take a ballot which does not rate Y >> top or equal-top. There must be some way to replace that with a ballot >> which ranks Y top or equal-top and still get an election which elects >> either X or Y. >> >> That is, for any result you can get with favorite betrayal, either you >> can get that same result without favorite betrayal, or you can get your >> favorite without favorite betrayal. >> > > That may still be incorrect, now that you mention it. Say your honest > preference is A>B>C>D>E=F, and that in the "baseline" case (where you don't > vote A, B, C, or D top), D wins. Then if rearranging your ballot so that A > is at top makes C win, then neither D nor A won after the rearranging, yet > C winning is an outcome you prefer, so that shouldn't fail the FBC. > > Sorry, I was unclear. In your example, there must be some A-top ballot where D or A wins (because what if your real preference is A>D>everyone else?). That doesn't mean that there cannot be any A-top ballot where C wins. So based on the information given, the method in that example has not yet failed the FBC. (Unless all possible A-top ballots make C win).
Jameson
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