On Nov 24, 2011, at 3:50 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of
people passionate about electoral reform
and that you put together a working consensus statement. I'm
trying to work it some more...
My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame
electoral reform simply and to limit the options proffered.
but they should be *good* options. limiting the proffered options
to IRV is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail.
That justifies promoting Condorcet - see below. Others deserve
arguing against:
FPTP- can only vote for one - why we are considering what to
promote.
Approval - can vote for more, but does not support expressing
unequal liking.
Range/score - demands expressing (in an amount understandable)
how much better one candidate is than another.
IRV or IRV3 - good voting, but counting does not promise to be
complete (see Burlington).
PR - that deserves promoting for such as legislators - but here
we are thinking of electing single officers such as mayors and
governors.
This is what FairVote does and they do it well.
no they don't. FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the IRV/STV
method of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the same
thing. i.e., once they convince voters, city councilors, and
legislators that ranked-choice voting is a good thing (by accurately
pointing out what is wrong with FPTP in a multiparty context and/or
viable independent candidates), they present IRV as it is the only
solution. that backfired BIG TIME here in Burlington Vermont.
If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then
ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a clear-cut
alternative to IRV3.
Condorcet.
which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but simplicity
is good. Schulze may be the best from a functional POV (resistance
to strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for Markus, the
Schulze method appears complicated and will be a hard sell. i also
do not think that cycles will be common in governmental elections
and am convinced that when a cycle rarely occurs, it will never
involve more than 3 candidates in the Smith set. given a bunch of
Condorcet-compliant methods that all pick the same winner in the 3-
candidate Smith set, the simplest method should be the one marketed
to the public and to legislators.
The ranking offers a bit of power that is easy to express - rank as
many candidates as you approve of, showing for each pair whether you
see them as A>B, A=B, or A<B, but no need to assign a value as to how
much the better exceeds the weaker (note that ranking a candidate you
do not approve of risks helping that reject win).
It is in ranking multiple candidates that we lead to voting for
more than two parties for we can vote among those parties plus our
true desire.
The voting is much like IRV's, except also permitting A=B. The vote
counting, unlike IRV's, considers all the ranking you vote.
While you can use as many ranks as the ballot permits, you are not
required to do more than express your desires - ranking one as in
FPTP, or more as equal as in Approval, is fine if that expresses your
thoughts (especially if you only wish the leader to win or lose).
To get a cycle you have to have three or more near tied candidates in
which each beats at least one of its competitors. Resolving such
requires a bit of fairness, but requires little more than that, since
we got there by being near to ties.
Dave Ketchum
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
