2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <un...@cs.columbia.edu> > A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote > tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual > processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported > results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome, > costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that, > even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the > other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections. > > Steve >
Agreed. (Notice how I manfully restrained myself from using the opening to promote SODA, which is very easy to tally by hand?) Jameson On Thu, 2 Feb 2012, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > For combined systems, I definitely prefer Abd's suggestion: vote a Range >> ballot, count it by various rules, and if the winner by the different >> rules >> does not agree, hold a runoff. In most cases, it would agree; and in the >> rest, a runoff would be a worthwhile second look at the best candidates, >> not a timewasting requirement to repeat a determination already given. >> >> Jameson >> >> 2012/2/2 Raph Frank <raph...@gmail.com> >> >> On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 3:22 AM, Dave Ketchum <da...@clarityconnect.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Voter can vote as in: >>>> . FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all >>>> >>> others >>> >>>> as equally liked less or disliked. >>>> . Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all >>>> >>> others as >>> >>>> equally liked less or disliked. >>>> . IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks for >>>> those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read only >>>> as >>>> many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions. >>>> . Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for >>>> >>> those >>> >>>> liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked equally. >>>> >>> >>> You can combine all of those methods (though not IRV) into a >>> super-ballot. I think this was suggested on this list at some point. >>> >>> Basically, you give each candidate a rating, but fractional rankings >>> are allowed. >>> >>> You then construct the condorcet matrix. If a voter ranks A as 1 and >>> B as 1.5, then that counts as half a vote for A over B. >>> >>> However, if the voter votes A as 1 and B as 5, then that only counts >>> as 1 vote for A over B, since each voter gets a maximum of 1 vote. >>> >>> Ranked candidates are considered preferred by a full vote over unranked. >>> >>> This allows the voters to decide which method to use. >>> >>> Condorcet >>> - just rank the candidates in order of your choice, equals allowed >>> >>> Approval >>> - rank approved candidates as 1 >>> >>> Range/Scorevoting >>> - rank all candidates from 0 to 1 (0 = favorite) >>> >>> Each voter could decide, without one group having much more power than >>> others. >>> >>> Abstains aren't handled that well. Scorevoting assumes that they >>> should have no effect. >>> >>> In theory, the rule could be that if a candidate is not ranked, then >>> no preference ordering is assumed. The ballot would have a zero for >>> all comparisons relative to that candidate. >>> >>> However, that is a lot of hassle, maybe there could be a box to >>> indicate how you want unranked candidates handled. Do you want them >>> equal lowest rank, or abstain. >>> >>> >>
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