Rich

 

Thanks for laying out the main definitions of “tamperproof”, and for your view 
on why my “story” is not an example thereof (it was only the one that I had 
“to-hand” at the time, and there must be many others J) .

 

Maybe, therefore, similar definitions/explanations should have been included in 
IEC 62368, so as to make it (much!) clearer to designers and 
testing/certification personnel as to the intent of the requirement because 
(obviously) there can be a considerable spread of interpretations of the 
requirement - or else John Cochran  (and probably many others!) would not ask 
the question.

 

As it stands, that “requirement” must thus be considered to be “ambiguous” at 
best, and therefore shouldn’t have been included in a standard in that form 
(I’m sure there must be a word to describe a definition with four different 
possible interpretations, but I’m afraid I don’t know it and thus “ambiguous” 
is the best that I can offer ATM!).

 

In fact, given the definitions you quote, I would suggest that the term should 
NOT have been included in the standard at all because they imply the likelihood 
of various levels of intentional interference/criminality on the parts of 
possible perpetrators. However, it should not have been the intent of the 62368 
standards-writing teams to address such issues - maybe YES if it were in a 
theft/ building-intrusion/ forgery prevention (etc.) standard, but NO in a 
broadly-targeted product safety standard.

 

John E Allen

W. London, UK

 

From: Richard Nute [mailto:ri...@ieee.org] 
Sent: 08 April 2019 23:40
To: EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

 

 

>From dictionary.com:

 

tamperproof 

adjective

1 that cannot be tampered with; impervious to tampering

 

tamper

verb (used without object)

1 to meddle, especially for the purpose of altering, damaging, or misusing 
(usually followed by with )

2 to make changes in something, especially in order to falsify (usually 
followed by with )

3 to engage secretly or improperly in something.

4 to engage in underhand or corrupt dealings, especially in order to influence 
improperly (usually followed by with )

 

The example provided by John Allen (UK) is not tampering as he did not take the 
unit apart for any of the above reasons.  Using the above definitions, the 
reasons for using any “tamperproof” construction assumes nefarious objectives 
on the part of the equipment users.  

 

Best regards,

Rich

 

 

From: John Allen <000009cc677f395b-dmarc-requ...@listserv.ieee.org> 
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 2:29 PM
To: EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

 

IMHO, the subject of “tamper-proofing devices” will be around for a “long time” 
because, once a “new” device is introduced, then “someone” will (pretty soon!) 
come up with a “workaround” – it’s just a case of when the workaround becomes 
available, and then when will someone find and use it, and NOT if  they will! L

 

By way of example, today I finally looked to see if I could fix an old 
non-functional plug-in mains-supplied timer, but then found that the 2 parts of 
the body were secured by “tamper-proof” screws, which were  roughly like a 
normal flat-blade screw head, but with a gap in the centre for a spigot on the 
end of the removal tool – which I have had in the toolbox for, probably, nearly 
a decade! Thus I had the timer apart in a few minutes (and then found the cause 
of the problem quite quickly).

 

Thus it’s a matter of “not if”, but “when”.

 

OTOH, to “come down to ground” - in practice, it all comes down to the question 
as to whether the “intended users” are likely to be able to find the 
workaround, and would then want to, bypass the safety measures ??????

 

John E Allen

W. London, UK

 

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