Hi John, My question is one of pragmatics. In an offline industrial environment, what is expected of the server to accomplish the stapling? Especially if the request is nonced.
Eliot > On 26 Oct 2020, at 13:08, John Mattsson > <john.mattsson=40ericsson....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > Hi, > > When this was discussed in the group, it was decided to not only mandate > revocation checking, but to also mandate OCSP stapling as is it often the > only viable solution to let an offline peer check the revocation status of > the server. We had a discussion on must-staple, and the decision was to > mandate stapling in the draft instead of waiting for support of the X.509 > must-staple extension. OCSP and OCSP stapling are quite well supported > already and should be even more well-supported in a few years: > > 1. Basically all TLS implementations support OSCP, and a majority support > OSCP stapling (Certificate Status Request). Mbed is an exception rather than > the rule. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations > > 2. All browsers (desktop and mobile) support OCSP stapling. > > https://blog.apnic.net/2019/01/15/is-the-web-ready-for-ocsp-must-staple/#:~:text=OCSP%20Must%2DStaple%20is%20a,Certificate%20Status%20Protocol%20(OCSP). > > 3. NIST SP 800-52 Rev 2 mandates that the server shall support use of the > Certificate Status Request extension (i.e. OCSP stapling). > > > - I do not think there is any wiggle room at all in the current version of > the draft: > > "When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, the peer and server MUST use Certificate > Status Requests [RFC6066] > for the server's certificate chain" > > Note that in the current draft it is unspecified how the server checks the > revocation status of the client's certificate: > > "When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, the server MUST check the revocation > status of the certificates in the > client's certificate chain." > > > - The X.509 must-staple extension > (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-muststaple-00) is not relevant > for server certificates in the current EAP-TLS 1.3 draft as stapling is > already a must. OSCP stapling is not very useful for client certs. I do not > know if the X.509 must-staple extension is well supported or not. It could > become relevant for server certs if the requirements are softened. > > > - My view is that OSCP stapling is a very good fit for EAP in particular and > is well-supported enough to be mandated. Mandating stapling for EAP-TLS 1.3 > from the start avoids having to rely on the X.509 must-staple extension. Any > implementation not supporting OCSP stapling should implement it together with > TLS 1.3. I do not think the requirent should be softened, but if it is, my > view is that is should be softened as little as possible. > > Cheers, > John > > _______________________________________________ > Emu mailing list > Emu@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
