On 2015-09-22 14:30, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: > I think that expired and revoked are mostly irrelevant, and actually > ill displayed in Enigmail today. The state doesn't depend on whether > the key is expired or revoked _today_. What matters is whether the > key was valid at the time of signature creation.
For *signing*, yes. For *encryption*... then it gets a bit weird. Encryption with a revoked key should be flagged as a problem *no matter what*, even for old messages. If the key was revoked because it was compromised, then any messages sent with that key are potentially readable by an attacker, regardless if they were sent before the key was revoked. Encryption with an expired key is more debatable; expiration doesn't necessarily mean that the key is compromised, but it also doesn't necessarily mean that it isn't. It's probably easiest to show IA state based on the state of the keys when the message was sent, and show P state based on the *current* state of the keys. (There really ought to be a user-adjustable revocation date when revoking a key, so that one can identify the time at which a key became compromised.) -- Matthew _______________________________________________ enigmail-users mailing list enigmail-users@enigmail.net To unsubscribe or make changes to your subscription click here: https://admin.hostpoint.ch/mailman/listinfo/enigmail-users_enigmail.net
