I'd love to make a serious comment at this point, but every one I can think of involves "I am Spartacus" jokes. Sorry.
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > 2008/10/31 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> > >>> Hi, > >>> > >>> 2008/10/31 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Of course the point is that you're not the same "you" > >>>>> from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information > >>>>> down to the > >>>>> molecular level, or even the neuron level. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> I agree, but that doesn't change the point I was trying to make. If > >>>> the collection of molecules that comes out the other end of the > >>>> teleporter is not identical to me, but it's as much like me as any > >>>> normal future collection of molecules that I change into moment-by- > >>>> moment, then I believe that my identity "completely survived" the > >>>> teleportation. (In the same sense that I "completely survive" an > >>>> average day of my normal life.) If the collection of molecules that > >>>> comes out the other end of the teleporter is a puddle of goo, I > >>>> believe that my identity completely failed to survive the > teleportation. > >>>> > >>>> My point is that "completely survived" and "completely failed to > >>>> survive" cannot be the only two possible cases. If it was, we'd be > >>>> left with the absurd conclusion that there's a single molecule of > >>>> difference between cases in which I completely survive and cases in > >>>> which I completely fail to survive. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> Why is this absurd ? You are composed of a finite number of > >>> molecule... it seems therefore logical that between you still feel as > >>> yourself and there is no more you... there is only one bit of > >>> difference. > >>> > >>> Regards, > >>> Quentin Anciaux > >>> > >>> > >> Why is "feeling yourself" dichotomous? What if you feel and act as > >> usual but you think your name is "Kory" instead of "Quentin". What if > >> you remember the childhood of Bruno as yours and you are very > >> knowledgeable about modal logic. > >> > >> Brent Meeker > >> > > > > Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me... > You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply > have the mistaken notion that your name is "Kory"? If your earliest > childhood memories were replaced by Bruno's, would you cease to exist? > > > And if my grandma had b... > > her name would be grandpa. > > > > If consciousness is information and feeling being an 'I' (and also a > > particular 'I') > > I think that is a false intuition. I don't believe that you directly > feel being Quentin Anciaux, it is a memory and an inference made up of > many bits of information. You are not feeling it at every moment, but > only when you think about "Who I am." at which time an appropriate name > and life history comes to mind. > > Brent > > > is information and indeed a finite length > > information... then one bit of difference and I'm not me... anything > > else but me. > > > > Regards, > > Quentin > > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---