Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2008/11/1 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> 2008/11/1 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >>> >>> >>>>> Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me... >>>>> >>>>> >>>> You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply >>>> have the mistaken notion that your name is "Kory"? If your earliest >>>> childhood memories were replaced by Bruno's, would you cease to exist? >>>> >>>> >>> I think I cannot be me without *my* memories... I equate memories and >>> me. If not what is me, if I'm still me without my memories ? >>> >>> >> But surely you don't require *all* your memories just to be you. And >> what about false memories? What if you had just one memory that was >> false of you but true of Bruno? You have no doubt forgotten many things >> from your childhood, so, as measured by information, you are quite >> different from the person you were then. >> > > You are implying that identity doesn't exist. What I'd say is that the > only thing I'm sure of in this world is the 'I'.. the particular 'I' > that is me. So no someone with the memories of the childhood of Bruno > and my current memories is not me... only because my current memories > are not consistent with Bruno's childhood, it follows than they > couldn't be my current memories. Inconsistent how? Surely not logically inconsistent. Perhaps there would be a nomological inconsistency. Or consistency might require something very improbable (like you being born in Belgium, but not having a Belgian birth certificate). But aren't some of your memories also improbable. How do you know they aren't someone else's.
> If my memories are erased and my body > still live, I think it's equivalent to have killed me... I'm (the 'I' > that is currently me) dead for all practical purpose. Now you would > say that I'm dying as time goes by because being different than a > second ago... but my memories still carries the same 'I'... and 'I' is > living in time and not an instantaneous data. I don't believe identity > is an illusion... and I need more than what if to disprove it. > > >>>>> And if my grandma had b... >>>>> her name would be grandpa. >>>>> >>>>> If consciousness is information and feeling being an 'I' (and also a >>>>> particular 'I') >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I think that is a false intuition. I don't believe that you directly >>>> feel being Quentin Anciaux, it is a memory and an inference made up of >>>> many bits of information. You are not feeling it at every moment, but >>>> only when you think about "Who I am." at which time an appropriate name >>>> and life history comes to mind. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>> It is not an intuition, it is an assumption >>> >> Your "feeling being a particular I" is an assumption? How can a feeling >> be an assumption? Isn't it a perception or at most the interpretation >> of a perception? >> >> Brent >> > > Ok, but it is the only perception that I'm sure of, only because 'I' > is needed to perceive. > > Regards, > Quentin > But you don't directly perceive "I". You have many perceptions that form a temporal sequence and which have a point-of-view in space and which evoked associations consistent with a certain fixed content of memory. From this an "I" is inferred. I don't believe one can directly perceive "being I". Bertrand Russell argued this same point many years ago in support of his neutral monism. Brent > >>> (that can be false, >>> sure)... Is counsciousness information ?.=> yes ? Is this information >>> finite ? (should be... what could be infinite length *information* ?) >>> >>> Regards, >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>> >>>>> is information and indeed a finite length >>>>> information... then one bit of difference and I'm not me... anything >>>>> else but me. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> Quentin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
