What are you calling "the process" when you've made two copies of it?
Bretn Michael Rosefield wrote: > But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are > characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty > regarding the exact mechanics of that process, or the external input, > then we can draw an extradimensional state-space in which the degrees > of uncertainty correspond to new variables. If we can try and place > bounds on the uncertainty then we can certainly produce a kind of > probability mapping as to future states of the process. > > > 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > > > Kory Heath wrote: > > On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > >> I think this problem is misconceived as being about probability of > >> survival. > >> > > > > In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into a > > teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the other end > > "changed" - missing a bunch of memories, personality traits, > etc., it > > doesn't seem quite correct to ask the question, "what's the > > probability that that person is me?" It seems more correct to ask > > something like "what percentage of 'me' is that person?" And in > fact, > > this is the point I've been trying to make all along - that we > have to > > accept some spectrum of cases between "the collection of molecules > > that came out is 100% me" and "the collection of molecules that came > > out is 0% me". > > > > The idea of probability enters the picture (or seems to) when we > start > > talking about multiple copies. If I step into a teleporter, am > > obliterated, and out of teleporter A steps a copy that's 100% me and > > out of teleporter B steps a copy that's 10% me, what's the best > way to > > view this situation? Subjectively, what should I believe that I'm > > about to experience as I step into that teleporter? It's hard for me > > not to think about this situation in terms of probability - to think > > that I'm more likely to find myself at A than B. It's especially > hard > > for me not to think in these terms when I consider that, in the case > > when the thing that ends up in teleporter A is 100% me and the thing > > that ends up in teleporter B is 0% me, the answer is unambiguous: I > > should simply believe that I'm going to subjectively experience > ending > > up in teleporter A. > > > > I'm sympathetic to the argument that it's still not correct to frame > > this problem in terms of probability. But I don't understand how > else > > to frame it. How do you (Brent) frame the problem? Subjectively, > what > > should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely to > > experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that the thing > > that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and the thing > > that's going to come out of Receiver B will be 10% me? > > > > -- Kory > > > The way I look at it, there is no "I". Kory-A and Kory-B are just two > different processes. We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory > that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter > about which one is *really* Kory. And there's no sense to the > question > of what "I should expect to experience" because "I" is nothing but a > process of experiencing anyway. We could make up some legal rule > (which > we would need if there really were teleporters) but it would have > to be > based on it's social utility, not ontology. > > Brent > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
