But I do think the nature of conscious qualia, as an abstract system, is interesting and non-trivial. Each person is their own universe - there is something more to feelings than just a neuron lighting up, they are part of an integrated dynamic.
2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Michael Rosefield wrote: > > I think there's so many different questions involved in this topic > > it's going to be hard to sort them out. There's 'what produces our > > sense of self', 'how can continuity of identity be quantified', 'at > > what point do differentiated substrates produce different > > consciousnesses', 'can the nature of consciousness be captured through > > snapshots of mental activity, or only through a dynamic interpretation > > taken over a period of time?'... and it's far too late for me to > > attempt to unravel all that! > > > > My feeling, though, is that once you've managed to assign some > > informational entity as being a conscious mind, then you could track > > it through time. > But notice that everything you say about paths and variables and > measure, apply to any system. Saying it is a conscious process doesn't > change anything. > > My guess is that eventually we'll be able to create AI/robots that seem > as intelligent and conscious as, for example, dogs seem. We'll also be > able to partially map brains so that we can say that when these neurons > do this the person is thinking thus and so. Once we have this degree of > understanding and control, questions about "consciousness" will no > longer seem relevant. They'll be like the questions that philosophers > asked about life before we understood the molecular functions of living > systems. They would ask:Where is the life? Is a virus alive? How does > life get passed from parent to child? The questions won't get > answered; they'll just be seen as the wrong questions. > > Brent > "One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before having > solved it." > --- Carl Ludwig Siegel > > > If you tweaked some physical variables, then much like a monte carlo > > simulation you could see potential paths it could follow. Given enough > > variables and tweaking, you might be able to fully populate the > > state-space according to what question we're asking, and it would seem > > to me to be all about measure theory. Of course, this doesn't say > > anything yet about any characteristics of the conscious mind itself, > > which is undoubtedly of importance. > > > > > > > > 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > > > > > > What are you calling "the process" when you've made two copies of it? > > > > Bretn > > > > Michael Rosefield wrote: > > > But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are > > > characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty > > > regarding the exact mechanics of that process, or the external > > input, > > > then we can draw an extradimensional state-space in which the > > degrees > > > of uncertainty correspond to new variables. If we can try and place > > > bounds on the uncertainty then we can certainly produce a kind of > > > probability mapping as to future states of the process. > > > > > > > > > 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> > > > > > > > > > Kory Heath wrote: > > > > On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > >> I think this problem is misconceived as being about > > probability of > > > >> survival. > > > >> > > > > > > > > In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into > a > > > > teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the > > other end > > > > "changed" - missing a bunch of memories, personality traits, > > > etc., it > > > > doesn't seem quite correct to ask the question, "what's the > > > > probability that that person is me?" It seems more correct > > to ask > > > > something like "what percentage of 'me' is that person?" > > And in > > > fact, > > > > this is the point I've been trying to make all along - that > we > > > have to > > > > accept some spectrum of cases between "the collection of > > molecules > > > > that came out is 100% me" and "the collection of molecules > > that came > > > > out is 0% me". > > > > > > > > The idea of probability enters the picture (or seems to) > > when we > > > start > > > > talking about multiple copies. If I step into a teleporter, > am > > > > obliterated, and out of teleporter A steps a copy that's > > 100% me and > > > > out of teleporter B steps a copy that's 10% me, what's the > > best > > > way to > > > > view this situation? Subjectively, what should I believe > > that I'm > > > > about to experience as I step into that teleporter? It's > > hard for me > > > > not to think about this situation in terms of probability > > - to think > > > > that I'm more likely to find myself at A than B. It's > > especially > > > hard > > > > for me not to think in these terms when I consider that, > > in the case > > > > when the thing that ends up in teleporter A is 100% me and > > the thing > > > > that ends up in teleporter B is 0% me, the answer is > > unambiguous: I > > > > should simply believe that I'm going to subjectively > > experience > > > ending > > > > up in teleporter A. > > > > > > > > I'm sympathetic to the argument that it's still not > > correct to frame > > > > this problem in terms of probability. But I don't > > understand how > > > else > > > > to frame it. How do you (Brent) frame the problem? > > Subjectively, > > > what > > > > should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely > to > > > > experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that > > the thing > > > > that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and > > the thing > > > > that's going to come out of Receiver B will be 10% me? > > > > > > > > -- Kory > > > > > > > The way I look at it, there is no "I". Kory-A and Kory-B > > are just two > > > different processes. We can ask how similar each one is to > > the Kory > > > that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the > > matter > > > about which one is *really* Kory. And there's no sense to the > > > question > > > of what "I should expect to experience" because "I" is > > nothing but a > > > process of experiencing anyway. We could make up some legal > > rule > > > (which > > > we would need if there really were teleporters) but it would > > have > > > to be > > > based on it's social utility, not ontology. > > > > > > Brent > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
