On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive device in the actual
supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that
device.
I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems to turn on what
is meant by "using that device". Is my brain using a neuron that
isn't firing? I'd say yes, it is part of the system and it's not
firing is significant.
Two old guys A and B decide to buy each one a car. They bought
identical cars, and paid the same price.
But B's car has a defect, above 90 mi/h the engine explode. But
both A and B will peacefully enjoy driving their car all the rest
of their life. They were old, and never go quicker than 60 mi/h
until they die. Would you say that A's car was driving but that
B's car was only partially driving.
If I'm a multiple-worlder I'd say B's car is driving with a lower
probability than A's.
Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal worlds,
and he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too. Only in Harry-
Potter worlds, where energy push him beyond that limit due to quantum
incident accumulation.
What about a brain with clever neurons. For example the neurons N24
anticipates that he will be useless for the next ten minutes, which
gives him the time to make a pause cafe and to talk with some glial
cells friends. Then after ten minutes he come back and do very well
its job. Would that brain be less conscious? He did not miss any
messages.
Same answer.
But this can only confirms that you put some magic in the presence of
matter. If matter plays that role, by comp it just needs we have to
"actively" emulate those inactive piece of matter, which by
definition, where not inactive then.
If inactive piece are needed, what about inactive soft subroutine?
Then I have to ask the doctor if the program he will put in my brain
evaluated in the lazy way, or strictly, or by value. Again, by
definition of comp, this is a matter of finding the right level, then
any implementation will do, any universal system will do. And the uda
consequences follows.
Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its
environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local
working of consciousness. But then you can no more say "yes" to the
digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption. This is like making a
current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory.
Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all its
employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do.
Molecular biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no
functions are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and
they are "called by need", and reconstituted only when they are useful.
The significance of the neuron (firing or not firing) is
computational. If for the precise computation C the neuron n is not
used in the interval of time (t1 t2), you may replace it by a
functionally equivalent machine for the working in that time
interval.
There is no problem
Well, there's not *that* problem.
? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be removed,
then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a sheaf
of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number
relations) going through you.
It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose
your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics
appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space
(that each Löbian number can discover "in its head").
And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1) giving
the qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*).
I tend to work at a more general, or abstract level, and I think
that consciousness needs some amount of self-reflection, two
universal machines in front of each other, at least. If Mars Rover
can add and multiply it may have the consciousness of Robinson
Arithmetic. If Mars Rover believe in enough arithmetical induction
rules, it can quickly be trivially Löbian. But its consciousness
will develop when he identifies genuinely and privately itself with
its unameable first person (Bp & p). Using Bp for public science
and opinions. It will build a memorable and unique self-experience.
To be clear, Mars Rover may still be largely behind the fruit fly
in matter of consciousness. The fruit fly seems capable to
appreciate wine, for example. Mars Rover is still too much an
infant, it wants only satisfy its mother company, not yet itself.
But it also doesn't conceive of "itself" and "its mother company" -
only it's mission.
Our universal machine are brainwashed at their birth (take this "cum
grano salis").
I think the interesting point is that the two may have
incommensurable consciousness; they may be "conscious" of different
things in different ways.
Most probably. In any case, neither the body of the fruit fly, nor the
body of Mars Rover can think, because Bodies don't think. Persons,
intellect or souls, can think. Bodies are projection of their mind on
their distribution in the universal dovetailing (or the tiny
equivalent arithmetical Sigma_1 truth).
If your theory assume a physical primary substance, it is up to you to
explain its role in consciousness. But MGA forces that move to invoke
actual infinities and non turing emulable aspects of the (generalized)
brain.
On the contrary, assuming comp, we get a very simple theory of
everything (elementary arithmetic), and a less simple phenomenological
account of consciousness and matter, in the way universal numbers
reflects themselves. But this follows and used only elementary
arithmetic. Like with Everett, the intended truth behind the formalism
(sigma_1 arithmetical truth) generates its (many) internal
interpretations, in term of machine discourses and what those
discourses are about (persons, lifes, death, taxes, etc.).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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