On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a
computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a
an actual computation currently not using that device.
I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems to turn on what is
meant by "using that device". Is my brain using a neuron that isn't
firing? I'd say yes, it is part of the system and it's not firing is
significant.
I see Tononi's theory as providing a kind of answer to questions like,
"Is a Mars Rover concsious and if so, what is it conscious of? Is it
more or less conscious than a fruit fly."
Brent
I f you have an idea, please elaborate. In my opinion this a priori
integrate well in the comp consequences. Thanks for that interesting
reference on a reasonable neurophysiological (and with a "high
substitution level" comp) account of consciousness and qualia,
probably consistent with auda, but not aware, like many, of the
conceptual reversal that the basic assumption imposes.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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